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Rising Tides-Changing Title:  
Court to Mull Takings Issue 
 
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal 
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John R. Nolon1
 
 
Abstract: The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Walton 
County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., where novel questions arose 
concerning sea level rise and constitutional property rights of beachfront 
landowners.  In Florida, the state government owns in trust, all beach property 
below the mean high tide water line, while beachfront landowners own the rights 
to any land above the mean high tide water line.  The line shifts along with 
beachfront as the beach expands and contracts.  In this Florida case, landowners 
challenge a state statute, which precludes the ocean property line from shifting in 
favor of the private landowner, even in situations where the state rebuilds an 
eroded beach.  Private owners claim that refusal to shift the mean high tide water 
line effectively takes away their private ownership rights.  This article discusses 
the constitutional takings issues presented by Walton County, including past 
Supreme Court takings decisions, and a discussion of pertinent Florida law.  
Finally, the article concludes with an overview of the legal issues raised by this 
case.   
 
*** 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Walton County v. Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Inc.  This Florida case raises novel questions about 
coastal erosion due to storm events, the prospect of sea level rise, and the 
definition of constitutionally protected property rights of beachfront property 
owners. Lawyers who represent riparian land owners, title agencies, mortgage 
companies, equity investors, and land use regulators should pay close attention 
to the arguments before the Court in this case and the eventual decision.  So 
should planners, citizens, and owners interested in the impacts of climate change 
which include storm surges, hurricanes, and the gradual landward movement of 
the tide.  
 
The setting for the Walton County case is a five mile stretch of beach along the 
Florida panhandle in Walton County that was critically eroded by several 
hurricanes. Much of the land adjacent to the beach is zoned for a variety of “pro-
tourist” uses and is developed as high rise hotels, mid-rise condominiums and 
commercial properties, and a variety of lower density retail, tourist, and 
                                                 
1 John R. Nolon is James A. Hopkins Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law, 
Counsel to its Land Use Law Center, and Visiting Professor at the Yale School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies.  Pace Law School student Joe Edgar contributed to this article.  
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residential uses.  Beach related tourism in Walton County accounts for over 
$250,000,000 in annual revenue and is a major reason for the government’s 
commitment to rebuilding beaches when storm surges and hurricanes severely 
erode them. Some parts of the beach nearly disappeared after hurricane Opal; 
others were significantly narrowed, affecting the access that the public, including 
tourists, have to walk up and down the beach, sun bathe, and swim.   
 
A variety of state grants, tax surpluses, bonds supported by future tax revenue, 
and other funds were accumulated by the Walton County Tourist Development 
Council.  Altogether $16 million was raised to cover the cost of beach 
renourishment.  The funds paid the costs of the beach rebuilding project, which 
was conducted under a Florida statute that requires two permits, detailed 
property surveys, and the protection of property rights as renourishment 
progresses.   The plaintiffs objected to the prospect of rebuilding, argued against 
the issuance of the required permits at administrative hearings conducted by the 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, and then challenged the statute 
in court as a regulatory taking.  They won at the District Court level in Florida, but 
lost when the Florida Supreme Court reversed.  They then successfully appealed 
for a Writ of Certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.  
 
At first blush, it is hard to understand why property owners would object to having 
their beaches improved, widened, and protected by the State of Florida at the 
expense of the tourism industry and the taxpayer.  The effect of the 
renourishment project, however, greatly expanded public access near their 
private lands.  The project substantially widens the beach, expanding public 
access by adding, on average, 100 feet of beach seaward of the pre-project 
mean high water line.  Constitutional arguments aside, these private owners 
object to the increased intensity of use by the public of the land in front of their 
properties.  Demonstrating that opposition to the renourishment project was not 
limited to the six plaintiffs involved, an association with 150 members sought, but 
was denied, standing to sue.   
 
The Legal Impact of the Statute 
 
The Beach and Shore Preservation Act was adopted by the state legislature in 
19612 to discharge the state’s duty under the Florida Constitution to protect 
natural resources,3 including coastal beaches.  Under the public trust doctrine, 4
 
  
the state owns legal title of the beach seaward of the mean high water line, which 
it holds on behalf of the public.  Nearly 400 miles of Florida’s 1,200 miles of 
shoreline in Florida is listed as “critically eroded” and in need of restoration under 
the Act, including the five miles in question in Walton County.  
                                                 
2 FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011-161.45 (2005). 
3 FLA. CONST. Art. II, §7(a). 
4 Id. art. X, § 11. 
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The Act authorizes state-sponsored renourishment projects and commits the 
state to maintain beaches restored and expanded by such projects. But for such 
projects, property owners gamble on the wiles of nature, accepting the risk of 
losing title to their land through erosion and gaining it through accretion: the 
gradual building up of the beach seaward of their property lines.  Erosion and 
accretion occur gradually and unpredictably.  As they transpire over the years, 
common law holds that the mean high water line is moved landward or seaward, 
and the boundary between public and private ownership shifts.  When storm 
events occur and the land is suddenly altered, the law provides that the boundary 
between state and upland ownership is not changed.  This is called avulsion.  
The doctrine allows both the state and the private owners affected by sudden 
shifts in land formation to take action to reclaim the land moved by avulsion. 
Case law in Florida clearly defines hurricanes as avulsive events. 
 
Once a renourishment project is completed under the Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act, the statute provides that the property line is fixed at the pre-
avulsion mean high water line.  It denominates this surveyed line the Erosion 
Control Line (ECL) and requires it to be recorded on the land records.   This 
statutory fixing of the property line takes away the risk of future erosion and the 
right to accretion.  The statute provides, however, that if the state fails to maintain 
and protect the restored beach, the property line reverts to the common law 
mean high water line.   
 
The plaintiff’s primary claim is that fixing—rendering immoveable—the property 
line constitutes a regulatory taking of a recognized common law property right: 
the right to accretion. Normally, if the beach expanded through accretion, that 
new land would belong to the upland owner.  The statute takes that right away, 
raising the issue of whether there exists a common law right to accretion under 
Florida law that is affected by the statute, and, if so, whether that amounts to a 
taking under the Constitution.  
 
The Regulatory Taking Issue: What is a Judicial Taking? 
 
The plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari claims that the Florida Supreme Court 
“invoked non-existent rules of state substantive law to reverse 100 years of 
uniform holdings that littoral rights are constitutionally protected.”  They call this a 
“judicial taking” and ask the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize this judicial 
redefinition of extant rights, combined with the working of the statute to fix their 
property line, as a compensable taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  
 
Over 15 years ago, the Court denied certiorari in a similar case where beachfront 
owners argued that an Oregon statute constituted a taking where it prevented 
building sea walls on the “dry sand area” of their beaches.  They lost when the 
Oregon Supreme Court held that the public had right to the dry sand area under 
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the “doctrine of custom.”5  Justice Scalia dissented from the denial of certiorari, 
writing that “the petitioners must be afforded an opportunity to make out their 
constitutional claim by demonstrating that the asserted custom is pretextual.”6  
Among other statements, Scalia indicated that the Oregon Supreme Court 
“appears to have misread Blackstone in applying the law of custom.”7
 
 
Is this the role of the U.S. Supreme Court: to decide the wisdom or accuracy of a 
state court’s determination of preexisting state law?  Perhaps one of the more 
interesting and important issues the Walton County case raises is whether 
matters of state common law, as determined by the highest state court, are 
reversible by the Court.  Scalia thinks so.  “Our opinion in Lucas…would be a 
nullity if anything that a State court chooses to denominate ‘background law’ -- 
regardless of whether it is really such -- could eliminate property rights.”8  The 
Court’s Lucas case held that a regulation that takes all economic use of a 
petitioner’s property is a taking unless, under the “background principles of the 
State’s law,”9 the use that the regulation prohibits is “not part of his title to begin 
with.”10
 
   
In Lucas, Scalia, writing for the majority, referred to “our traditional resort to 
‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 
state law’ to define the range of interests that qualify for protection as ‘property’ 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”11   In Lucas, the Court stated, 
“Although it seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented 
the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on Lucas’s land, this 
state-law question must be dealt with on remand.”12  The Lucas decision also 
accommodates the notion that change in common law principles happens.  “The 
fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners 
ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition though changed 
circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no 
longer so.”13  In Phillips Petroleum, the Court held that “[s]tates have the 
authority to define the limits of lands held in public trust and to recognize private 
rights in such lands as they see fit.”14
 
 
For devotees of regulatory takings doctrine, the Walton County case is not a 
Lucas type of case. There is no regulation at issue that takes the economic value 
of the parcel owned by the petitioners.  Walton County is best described as a 
                                                 
5 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993). 
6 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 n.5 (1994). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 1212. 
9 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
10 Id. at 1027. 
11 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 577 (1972)). 
12 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. 
13 Id. (citing Restatement (Second)  of Torts § 827 (1965). 
14 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988). 
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Loretto-style case, different a per se category of takings.15
 
 The Walton County 
case raises the somewhat novel issue of whether the “appropriation” of a 
common law property right, such as the right to accretion, constitutes a 
compensable taking. The typical Loretto case involves a challenge to a 
governmental action that imposes an affirmative easement on private property 
where there is no application by the affected owner for a governmental permit.   
Mrs. Loretto was simply told that she had to grant an easement to the cable 
company to allow them to install and maintain cables for the convenience of her 
tenants. Even though the intrusion was de minimis, the Court held that a taking of 
her fundamental right of exclusion occurred.  Similarly, the beachfront owners in 
Walton County are told that their property lines will be fixed by the statute even 
though they are not before a public body for a building or development permit.  
 
The Florida Supreme Court recognizes that a “governmental appropriation” of a 
discrete property right, one stick in the bundle of rights, can constitute a 
compensable taking.  In Walton County, it refers to Lee County v. Kiesel, which 
held that riparian owners own a right to an unobstructed view of the water and 
that this right was violated by the construction of a bridge on government lands 
built at an angle to the water line that obstructed their view.16
 
  The court, in Lee, 
held this to be a compensable taking.  The Lee court cites two prior Florida cases 
for the proposition. It then held that the right to a view is not absolute, recognizing 
the government’s right to obstruct it to a degree, but notes that the government 
action must not “substantially and materially obstruct the land owner’s view of the 
channel.”  
The Lee court calls this a case by case analysis--a process of making an 
“equitable distribution” regarding the submerged lands between the upland and 
the Channel.  This would seem to call for similar flexibility with regard to 
renourishment, rendering the other common law rights of the littoral owners less 
than absolute.  In this sense, it differs from the absolutist view of imposing an 
affirmative easement as in Loretto under which even the slightest invasion is 
compensible. 
 
Did the Florida Court Make Up New Rules as a Pretext for Validating the 
Act?  
 
Under Florida common law, the defendants own title landward of the mean high 
water line, while the state owns, in public trust, the land seaward of that line.  The 
line is adjusted automatically every 19 years as tides change following historically 
predictable cycles that influence the tides. Littoral owners also own corollary 
rights including the rights of accretion, access to the water, use of the water, and 
an unobstructed view of the water. These are private property rights that cannot 
be taken from upland owners without just compensation. 
                                                 
15 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
16 Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So.2d 1013 (1998). 
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The Supreme Court of Florida begins its opinion noting that prior court decisions 
have not dealt with many of the common law property right issues raised by 
beach renourishment.  Curiously, this seems to be the situation in other 
prominent coastal states, including California and New York: the common law of 
littoral rights is poorly developed, despite the increasingly critical importance of 
coastal protection and property rights.  The court also notes that it reviews 
matters of law of this type de novo and must be the arbiter of property law, giving 
deference to the legislature and presuming the constitutionality of its actions 
where possible.  This is particularly so here, since the court treats the plaintiffs’ 
challenge as a facial attack on the statute where it has to be shown that there 
exists no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid. 
 
The court notes that the statute preserves several of the corollary littoral rights: 
the right of access, use, and view, including the right of ingress and egress, after 
a renourishment project is completed.   The lower court held that the common 
law rights of accretion and of contact with the water are taken by the statute.  The 
Florida Supreme Court disagreed. It asserts that the lower court misunderstands 
the law of avulsion. Florida common law holds that when sudden loss or addition 
of land occurs—an avulsion-- the property line does not move as it does with 
accretion; it remains fixed at the former mean high water line.  Following such an 
event, both the state and the upland owner have a reasonable time to reclaim 
their lost lands.  Prior case law establishes that hurricanes are avulsive events 
and that the loss of the sovereign’s interest in the beach may be recovered by 
self help on the part of the state.  The court argues that the statute simply 
codifies the state’s common law right to reclaim storm-ravaged lands by fixing the 
boundary line at the pre-event mean high water line.   
 
Although the court recognizes the existence of a common law right of accretion, it 
notes that it is a contingent right, arising out of a rule of convenience and that the 
reasons for establishing the common law right of accretion do not apply to the 
statute. Florida common law established four reasons for recognizing the right of 
accretion; the court looks at each one and determines that none of them is 
implicated in the context of renourishment by the state of beaches seriously 
eroded by avulsive events.  It goes through each of four underlying reasons for 
the doctrine and demonstrates why each does not apply.  
 
It disagrees with the district court regarding the upland owner’s right to contact 
with the water.  It explains that this right is ancillary to the owner’s right of access, 
which is preserved by the statute, quoting its prior decision in Board of Trustees 
v. Sand Key Associates.17 “We have never addressed whether littoral rights are 
unconstitutionally taken based solely upon the loss of an upland owner’s direct 
contact with the water.”18
                                                 
17 Board of Trustees of the International Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Associates, 512 
So.2d 934 (Fla. 1987). 
  Citing the statute’s preservation of the right of access, 
18 Id. at 936. 
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the court concludes “at least facially, these provisions ensure that the upland 
owner’s access to the water remains intact. Therefore, the rationale for the 
ancillary right to contact is satisfied.” 
 
Questions Raised 
 
So many constitutional and practical issues are raised by the Walton County 
case.  Will the Court use the Lucas concept of a total taking and apply it to the 
taking of a discrete stick from the bundle of property rights, or will it see Walton 
County as a Loretto-style case, but refine Loretto to include and explain how it 
should be used in a government appropriation case rather than its traditional use 
in invasion cases? 
 
Did the Florida Supreme Court reinterpret common law as a pretext for validating 
the Beach and Shore Preservation Act?  Is there any clear holding of a previous 
Florida Supreme Court decision in the context of beachfront erosion that was 
confused, reversed, or misinterpreted by the decision?  If common law shifts 
gradually, like the mean high water line, should a “judicial taking” be found when 
a state court applies previous common law principles to emerging circumstances 
like coastal erosion in a time of climate change?  What would the U.S. Supreme 
Court have to find wrong with the state court’s analysis to justify reversal on the 
basis of state common law?  By what powers of divination does the Court 
determine that a state court decision is motivated by a pretext?   
 
This is clearly a case to watch. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
